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Studies have shown that firm asset growth predicts cross-sectional stock returns. Firms 
that shrink their assets earn superior returns while firms that substantially expand their 
assets incur poor returns in the following years. I show that the negative asset growth often 
implies poor operating performance and a high probability subsequently to be delisted 
from the exchanges and that the high asset growth is primarily fuelled by large external 
financing. The seemingly superior returns of the negative asset growth portfolios are due 
to the omission of delisting returns. The poor returns of the high asset growth portfolios 
coincide with the widely-documented return underperformance of firms that have resorted 
to debt or equity offerings. Controlling for the delisting bias and the underperformance 
following large external financing, I do not find an independent effect of asset growth on 
stock returns. 
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1. Introduction  
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) present a significant asset growth effect in U.S. stock returns. 
In the period of 1968-2003, firms in the lowest asset growth decile on average earn risk-adjusted 
returns of 9.1% in the subsequent year, while firms in the highest asset growth decile earn -10.4%, 
resulting in an annual return spread of 19.5%. The spread in value-weighted returns reduces to 
8.4% per year but remains statistically significant. The return spreads are significant across 
different size groups and persist into several years after forming the portfolios. This cross-sectional 
stock return pattern, frequently referred to as “the asset growth anomaly”, quickly becomes 
influential.1 It is often investigated in recent studies, for example, Fama and French (2008), Li and 
Zhang (2010), and among others, as a new anomaly, parallel with other well-known cross-sectional 
anomalies such as momentum, net stock issues, and accrual anomalies.  
The median firm in the lowest asset growth decile shrinks its total assets by more than 20% 
within a year. What has happened and will happen to these firms decreasing their assets at such a 
fast and furious speed? I show that many of these firms have performed poorly and are dying out in 
the near future. If the stock of an asset-shrinking firm gets delisted in the following year, I find that 
over 90% of the time its return in the delisting month is not reported in CRSP’s regular monthly 
stock return file. Since performance-related delisting returns tend to be very negative (for instance, 
the mean delisting return in my sample is -38.3%), omitting them in the computation of portfolio 
returns introduces a significant survivorship bias into the tests. This might result in the seemingly 
high returns of the negative asset growth portfolios.  
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, stock return anomalies refer to excess returns that cannot be explained by the stock’s 
associated risk. Relating risk to return requires the use of an accurate asset pricing model, which researchers 
are still exploring. More broadly, an anomaly is a stylized pattern in stock returns that cannot be explained by 
existing asset pricing models such as CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model. The use of the word 
“anomaly” in this paper is in reference to this broader definition.  
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The median firm in the top asset growth decile increases its assets by 125% within a year. What 
drives the explosive increase in these firms’ assets? The 125% increase in assets is unlikely a result 
of firm organic growth. I show that these firms fast expand their assets by issuing large amounts of 
debt and equity, or externally financed acquisitions. Large external financing mechanically 
increases the issuer’s assets. Vast evidence suggests that firms incur abnormally low returns 
following large equity and debt financing.2 It is therefore interesting to know to what extent the 
asset growth anomaly is related to the widely documented external financing anomaly.  
In this paper, I show that the asset growth anomaly is almost completely driven by the delisting 
bias and the external financing anomaly. In particular, the superior returns of the negative asset 
growth portfolios are due to the omission of delisting returns in the CRSP monthly stock return 
data. The return outperformance disappears once the delisting returns are included in computing 
the portfolio returns. The poor returns of the high asset growth portfolios coincide with the return 
underperformance of firms that have issued a large amount of debt and/or equity. Controlling for 
these two factors, I do not find an independent effect of asset growth on stock returns.  
Shumway (1997) is the first to document the delisting bias in CRSP data. He finds severe 
omissions of delisting returns in CRSP data, especially for firms delisted for performance reasons. If 
this fact is ignored, portfolio returns constructed from CRSP data are upward biased. I examine 
20,857 non-financial stocks that have appeared in the CRSP monthly stock return file (CRSP.msf) 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Ritter (2003), Daniel and Titman 
(2006), and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) for evidence of underperformance following equity issuances; 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), Lee and Loughran (1998), Dichev and Piotroski (1999), Billett, Flannery, 
and Garfinkel (2006) for evidence of underperformance following various types of debt issuances; Collins and 
Kim (2013) for evidence of underperformance following acquisition-driven asset growth; Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) for evidence of outperformance following 
stock repurchases. Combining them, Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) develop a comprehensive 
measure of net external financing and confirm a strong negative relation between net external financing and 
subsequent stock returns. 
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during the period from July 1968 to December 2013. Among them only 3,929 (18.84%) are still 
listed by the end of 2013. Of the 16,916 delisted stocks, only 1,589 (9.39%) have a return reported 
for the delisting month in CRSP.msf. In other words, more than 90% of the delisted stocks do not 
have their delisting returns recorded in the file. Moreover, I have verified that, even for the less 
than 10% with a return recorded in CRSP.msf, the reported return is not the delisting return which, 
recorded in the other file, is 10% lower on average, or 25% lower if conditional on delisting due to 
performance reasons. How serious is to omit delisting returns? Shumway and Warther (1999) 
collected a large proportion of missing delisting returns from other sources (such as Pink Sheets) 
and show that the delisting return is on average -30%. It could reduce further to -55% if the drop in 
stock liquidity after delisting and the expected worse returns of those uncollectable delisted stocks 
are accounted for. Beaver, McNichols, and Price (2007) investigate the impact of delisting returns 
on return anomalies based on accounting variables such as earnings, accruals, cash flows, and the 
book-to-market ratio (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Sloan, 1996). They also show that portfolio 
returns sorted on these accounting variables are sensitive to the treatment of delisting returns, 
“due to the disproportionate concentration of delisting firm-years with very negative returns in the 
lowest decile of these variables.” (p.342)  
Dividing stocks into deciles based on the asset growth rate, I find that firms in the lowest asset 
growth decile incur extremely poor operating performance (-12.71% in ROA) and the probability of 
delisting due to poor performance in the following year is almost four times as high as it is for firms 
in other deciles (9.60% vs. 2.67%). This evidence hints the importance of the delisting bias in 
generating the asset growth anomaly, especially for the abnormally high portfolio return of the 
most negative asset growth decile (decile 1). Indeed, after correcting the delisting bias, I do not find 
that stocks in decile 1 earn significantly higher returns than most other deciles.  
On the other tail, stocks in the highest asset growth deciles, deciles 9 and 10 specifically, still 
earn abnormally low returns. These firms, however, have issued large amounts of debt and equity 
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in the previous year. I show that the dominant part of the high asset growth is mechanically due to 
the large equity and debt issuances. For instance, of the 125% average increase in assets for firms 
in decile 10, external financing has contributed 105.5% (84%). In a different way of illustration, 
87% of the firms in decile 10 have conducted at least a large equity or debt offering. This number is 
in sharp contrast to only 3%~5% of the firms in the first seven asset growth deciles that have 
sought external financing of similar magnitude.  
There is ubiquitous evidence that firms realize poor returns following large external financing. 
Some recent examples are Ritter (2003), Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006), Billett, Flannery, 
and Garfinkel (2006), and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). What is really interesting is, after 
controlling for the effect of external financing, whether high asset growth still predicts low stock 
returns. The mechanical relation between external financing and asset growth allows me to 
perform a clean and direct test. In particular, I subtract the part of asset growth due to external 
financing and then examine the relation between the net asset growth and returns. I use multiple 
ways, based on the balance sheet and statement of cash flow data, to derive this net asset growth. In 
research methodology, I employ both the portfolio sorting approach and the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Overall, I do not find a robust negative relation between the net asset growth and the 
subsequent stock returns. In some specifications the relation even becomes positive. I therefore 
conclude that, after removing the impact of external financing and adjusting the delisting bias, asset 
growth does not have an independent effect on stock returns in the cross-section. 
The asset growth anomaly has generated much research interest. Studies have attempted to 
explain the phenomena from behavioral or economic points of view. Cooper, Gulen, and Schill 
(2008) argue that the asset growth anomaly is most consistent with investor over extrapolation of 
past gains to growth. Chan, Karceski, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2008) show that the anomaly is 
more pronounced in firms with low past profitability and poor corporate governance, and suggest 
that it is due to investors’ under-reaction to managers’ empire-building investments. Lipson, 
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Mortal, and Schill (2011) show that the anomaly is more evident in stocks with high idiosyncratic 
volatility and argue that costly arbitrage is the driving force behind the anomaly. Li and Zhang 
(2010) also imply that limits-to-arbitrage seems to excel the q-theory in a horse race to explain the 
anomaly. Lam and Wei (2011) however suggest that the q-theory with investment frictions explains 
the anomaly as much as limits-to-arbitrage does.  
Watanabe, Xu, Yao, Yu (2013) confirm the asset growth effect in many international markets, 
however, they find that the effect is stronger in relatively more developed and efficient capital 
markets and is not related to country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor 
protection, and accounting quality. Their evidence casts doubt on the behavioral explanations for 
the anomaly. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) show that the anomaly can largely be explained 
by the market risk premium factor and two new factors they propose — an investment factor and a 
return-on-asset factor. Since these factors are motivated by rational economic models, they suggest 
that the anomaly could be explained by risk-based theories.  
I take a different approach. Instead of searching for economic or behavioral driving forces, I 
scrutinize whether the observed return pattern represents a new anomaly or just morphs from 
some known return regularities. My empirical methods are simple, straightforward, yet illustrative. 
My findings point to the latter. The findings highlight the importance of correcting the delisting bias 
in asset pricing tests, first proposed by Shumway (1997). I show that the CRSP monthly stock 
return file (CRSP.msf) that researchers frequently rely on does not include delisting returns. Asset 
pricing tests that are sensitive to the delisting bias should incorporate delisting returns recorded in 
the other CRSP file. In addition, I show the strong mechanical relation between high asset growth 
and external financing. The asset growth anomaly in a large part reflects the return 
underperformance following large external financing. However, this paper does not investigate the 
reasons for the external financing anomaly. A few studies have already made efforts along this 
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important line of research, for instance, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004; 2006), Lyandres, 
Sun, and Zhang (2008), Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2013), among others.  
2. Data and Variables 
Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008, hereafter CGS), I examine all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ nonfinancial firms (excluding firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) with returns 
included in the CRSP monthly stock return file (CRSP.msf) and accounting information included in 
the COMPUSTAT fundamentals annual file (COMP.funda). Firms are also required to be included in 
the fundamentals annual file for at least two fiscal years so that we can construct the asset growth 
variable. Stock returns examined in CGS are between July 1968 and December 2003 and I extend 
their sample to December 2013 or 544 months in total. I also calculate the asset growth rate (AG) as 
the year-to-year percentage change in total assets (AT): 
  (   )  
  (   )
  (   )
   .        (1)  
At the end of June of each year t from 1968 to 2013, stocks are allocated into deciles based on 
the ranking of each firm’s asset growth rate from fiscal year t-2 to t-1. Firms in decile 1 have the 
lowest and firms in decile 10 have the highest asset growth rates. Portfolios are held from July of 
year t to June of year t+1 and then rebalanced (based on the growth rates from fiscal year t-1 to t).  
The first row in Table 1 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional median asset 
growth rate in each decile. The average year-to-year asset growth rate is about -22% for firms in 
decile 1 (the lowest AG) and is 125% for firms in decile 10 (the highest AG). The sorting results in 
the spread between decile 1 and 10 to be as high as 147%. The average asset growth rate of firms in 
the whole sample is 8.5% and about 27% of firms reduce their assets.  
Table 1 also presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional median market 
capitalization (ME) in the previous month and book-to-market equity ratio (B/M) in the previous 
fiscal year. Market capitalization is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the December 
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2013 dollars and reported in millions. It shows an inverse U-shape across the asset growth deciles. 
Firms in the middle deciles are the largest in size and firms on the two sides are relatively small. 
Especially for firms in decile 1 that have incurred the most negative asset growth, the average 
market capitalization is only about $ 50 million in 2013 dollars. The statistics on B/M suggest that 
assets-shrinking firms are value firms while assets-expanding firms are growth firms. I follow Fama 
and French (2008) in computing B/M ratios.  
  3. The asset growth anomaly in portfolio returns  
After allocating firms into decile portfolios based on their asset growth rates in fiscal year t-1, I 
calculate the monthly equal- and value-weighted returns for portfolios from July of year t to June of 
year t+1. This procedure generates a time-series of returns for each portfolio from July 1968 to 
December 2013 (544 months in total). Table 1 presents the time-series means of the monthly 
portfolio returns. The equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio returns decrease (almost) 
monotonically from low asset growth deciles to high asset growth deciles. Stocks in the lowest asset 
growth decile (decile 1) earn an equal-weighted monthly return of 1.79% and stocks in the highest 
asset growth decile (decile 10) earn 0.20% on average. A hedging portfolio long in decile 1 stocks 
and short in decile 10 stocks earns a monthly return of 1.59% (t-statistic = 9.49) in the following 
year. It translates to an annual return spread of 19.08%. In value-weighted portfolio returns, firms 
in decile 1 earn 1.21% and firms in decile 10 earn 0.41% on average per month, resulting in a 
spread of 0.81% (t-statistic = 4.07). As a comparison, CGS reports a monthly spread of 1.73% (t-
statistic = 8.45) in equal-weighted portfolio returns and 1.05% (t-statistic = -5.04) in value-
weighted portfolio returns for their sample.3 For the purpose of later analysis, I also report the 
return spreads between decile 1 and decile 6, where decile 6 is taken as the middle decile. Firms in 
decile 6 have achieved some positive growth in assets but not large in magnitude (10.6% on 
                                                 
3 The slight differences in magnitude between CGS and my results are due to the difference in our sample 
periods. In fact, I was able to replicate their results in their sample period in almost the same magnitude. 
 9 
average). The equal-weighted return spread between decile 1 and 6 is also statistically significant 
(0.53% per month with a t-statistic of 2.66), mainly due to the superior returns of stocks in decile 1. 
If portfolio returns are value-weighted, the spread between decile 1 and 6 is positive but not 
statistically significant.   
Next, I run time-series regressions of the portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 
three factors. This is to estimate the alphas – the average returns that are not explained by the 
Fama and French three factors. The implicit null hypothesis is that the Fama and French three-
factor model does an adequate job of explaining expected returns associated with firm asset 
growth. Therefore, a statistically significant alpha – the intercept from the time-series regression - 
suggests an “abnormal” return. The regression results are again similar to those reported in CGS. 
Using equal-weighted portfolio returns, firms in the lowest asset growth decile have a monthly 
alpha of 0.54%, while the highest growth firms have an alpha of –0.89%. Both the outperformance 
of decile 1 and the underperformance of decile 10 are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
alpha for the hedging portfolio is 1.42% (t-statistic = 9.53). Using value-weighted portfolio returns, 
firms in the lowest asset growth decile have a monthly alpha of 0.05%, and firms with the highest 
asset growth rates have an alpha of –0.46%. The alpha for the hedging portfolio is 0.51% (t-statistic 
= 3.15). The hedging portfolio long decile 1 and short decile 6 yields a significantly positive alpha if 
returns are equal-weighted but no abnormal return if returns are value-weighted.  
So far I have reproduced the key evidence of asset growth anomaly. Next in Section 4, I examine 
the operating performance and the probability of delisting for firms in each decile and the 
implication for portfolio returns if delisting returns are omitted. In Section 5, I investigate to what 
extent high asset growth is fuelled by large external financing and the implications for the asset 
growth anomaly if external financing is controlled for.  
4. The delisting bias and its implications for the asset growth anomaly 
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Stock exchanges sometimes delist stocks before investors are able to sell them. Reasons for 
delisting include mergers and acquisitions, liquidations, moving to other exchanges, and poor 
performance (e.g. bankruptcy, insolvency, insufficient capital etc.). The CRSP monthly stock return 
file, in particular CRSP.msf, often does not include the delisting-month returns of the delisted 
stocks. Omitted delisting returns introduce a survivorship bias in empirical tests, as only the 
survivors’ returns are accounted for. The delisting bias in the CRSP data is first documented by 
Shumway (1997). He shows that CRSP return data do not include delisting returns for most stocks 
that have been delisted for poor performance reasons. For example, only 120 out of 1029 firms 
(11.7%) delisted from NYSE and AMEX due to poor performance during the period between 1962 
and 1993 have their delisting return reported in CRSP's stock return files. For these reported cases, 
the average delisting return is -41.56%. The situation is even worse for NASDAQ – more firms have 
been delisted from NASDAQ due to poor performance, and none of their delisting returns is 
included in CRSP’s stock return files. He also shows that delists for performance-related reasons are 
generally surprises and thus incur very negative returns. 
Motivated by Shumway’s work, the CRSP research department has expended efforts and 
resources to retrieve delisting returns. Over 90% of the delisting returns are successfully retrieved, 
according to the CRSP white paper CRSP Delisting Returns (2001). This certainly saves researchers 
efforts from collecting the delisting returns from sources like Pink Sheets as Shumway did earlier. 
The retrieved delisting returns are recorded in a file called monthly stock event file (CRSP.mse), 
which is separate from CRSP’s monthly stock return file (CRSP.msf).4 The monthly stock return file 
collects monthly returns of the stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ since January 1926 
and is currently the most popular database for empirical tests on stock returns. But this file does 
                                                 
4 I was informed by the CRSP staff that the separation of the regular-month returns and the delisting-month 
returns into two files could result from WRDS’s repackaging of the CRSP data.  
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not include delisting returns. If researchers perform empirical tests solely based on this file, their 
results suffer from the delisting bias.  
I use a simple test to illustrate that delisting returns are often omitted in CRSP.msf. Table 2 
reports my findings. I first identify all non-financial firms that have their stock returns once 
included in the CRSP monthly stock return file during the period from July 1968 to December 2013. 
Of the 20,857 stocks in total, only 3,929 (19%) are still listed and traded at one of the three markets 
by December 2013. Of the remaining stocks, I am able to identify the month of delisting for 16,916 
stocks using CRSP’s monthly stock event file (CRSP.mse). I then check if CRSP.msf reports a non-
missing return in the month of delisting for these delisted stocks. Only 1,589 out of the 16,916 
stocks (9.39%) have a return reported for the delisting month, while the remaining over 90% 
stocks fail to do so. Among them about a half are delisted for performance-related reasons. 
Moreover, even for the 1,589 delisted stocks with returns reported in CRSP.msf for the delisting 
month, most of the reported returns have not accounted for the delisting effect. For example, if the 
delists are for performance-related reasons, the delisting returns reported in CRSP.mse are on 
average 25% lower than the reported returns in CRSP.msf. Of the 16,916 delisted stocks in my 
sample period, the average delisting return is -16.22%, and if the delisting is due to performance 
reasons (46.5%), the average delisting return reduces to -38.3%. 
Omitted delisting returns introduce a bias into studies that only use CRSP’s monthly stock 
return file, especially when the variable of interest is correlated with the probability of delisting. 
For example, Shumway and Warther (1999) show that the widely-documented size effect 
disappears after correcting the delisting bias. Firms often reduce in size before being delisted for 
poor performance. Small firms are found to have abnormally high returns because, when the 
returns of size portfolios are computed based on CRSP.msf, it fails to account for the very negative 
returns of those delisted small firms. In other words, only returns of the survived small firms are 
used to compute the portfolio returns, which results in an inflated portfolio return for small stocks. 
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The delisting bias could also lead to the discovery of the asset growth anomaly. It is not surprising 
to expect a decline of asset value for a distressed firm before delisting. If firms in the negative asset 
growth portfolios tend to be delisted more often than firms in the positive growth portfolios, the 
superior returns found in the following year for the low growth portfolios could merely be the 
result of omitted delisting returns. 
I examine the potential of such a delisting bias on the asset growth anomaly. First I investigate 
whether firms with the lowest asset growth tend to perform poorly and have a higher chance to be 
delisted in the following period. Table 3 presents the results. The first row shows that the average 
operating performance, measured by returns on assets (ROA), monotonically increases from -
12.71% for firms in decile1 to 8.00% for decile 9 while it drops a bit for firms in decile 10. The 
extremely poor performance of decile 1 raises serious doubt on the firms’ survival in the following 
period. Indeed I find that the probability of delisting is as high as 13.71% for stocks in decile 1. In 
other words, if a firm’s asset growth is in the bottom 10% among all the firms, the chance for the 
firm to be delisted in the following year is almost 14%. Shumway (1997) suggests that the delisting 
bias is more pronounced for stocks delisted for performance-related reasons. I follow his work to 
estimate the probability of delisting due to poor performance. Reasons for delisting (i.e., the 
delisting code) are obtained from CRSP’s stock event file. Stocks in the lowest asset growth decile 
have a 9.60% probability of being delisted in the following year due to poor performance, while the 
probability is 4.82% for stocks in the highest asset growth decile. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level using a two proportion z-test. Stocks in the second lowest asset growth 
decile (decile 2) also have a high probability of delisting for performance-related reasons, i.e. 
4.58%. In comparison, the probability for deciles 3 to 9 ranges only from 1.58% to 2.90%. The 
evidence sends a clear message: compared to stocks with moderate or high asset growth, stocks 
with negative asset growth have a significantly higher probability of delisting in the following year 
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due to poor performance. Omitting delisting returns therefore introduces a significant bias to the 
returns on the portfolios of poorly performed stocks. 
To correct the delisting bias, we need backfill the delisting returns for the delisted stocks into 
the stock return file. CRSP has retrieved delisting returns for more than 95% of the delisted stocks 
in my sample period. The delisting returns together with the reasons for delisting are stored in the 
stock event file (again, not the monthly stock return file). As suggested in Shumway (1997), 
delisting triggered by performance-related reasons (delisting codes 500, 505 to 588) incur 
extremely negative returns. Based on CRSP.mse, about 28% of the stocks delisted from NYSE or 
AMEX are triggered by poor firm performance and these stocks have an average delisting return of -
36%. The average delisting return for poor-performing NASDAQ stocks is -18.2% but a higher 
proportion of the delisted stocks in NASDAQ (54%) are triggered by poor performance. Moreover, 
stocks that do not have their delisting return retrieved are primarily triggered by performance-
related reasons (93% of 142 observations). Shumway and Warther (1999) argue that the delisting 
returns of those unidentified stocks are almost certainly worse and the fact that there remains no 
trace of those stocks suggests that many may have become worthless. 
I correct the delisting bias as follows. For the 90% of stocks in the monthly stock return file 
without delisting-month returns, I compound their last-reported return with the delisting return in 
the monthly stock event file. For the other 10% of stocks that have a return reported for the 
delisting month, I take the average of the reported return in the stock return file and the delisting 
return in the stock event file (Note: the results do not change if I also compound them). Note there 
are about 5% of delists that CRSP is unable to retrieve their delisting returns. I replace the missing 
delisting returns in the stock event file by the average delisting returns in the same stock exchange, 
depending on if the delisting is due to performance-related reasons or not. That is, if an NYSE or 
AMEX (NASDAQ) stock delisted for performance-related reasons does not have its delisting return 
reported, I assume its delisting return is -36.0% (-18.2%). Otherwise an NYSE/AMEX (NASDAQ) 
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stock with missing delisting return is assumed to have a delisting return of 2.76% (3.14%). This is a 
more conservative treatment relative to assuming -100% for irretrievable poor-performing 
delisted stocks.  
Table 3 presents the portfolio returns after correcting the delisting bias. The correction results 
in lower returns for all asset growth portfolios, but its effect is the largest on the lowest decile. The 
average equal-weighted return of decile 1 drops from 1.79% per month before correction to 1.45% 
after correction. This translates into a drop of 34 basis points per month or 4.16% per annum. The 
average equal-weighted return of decile 10 also drops from 0.20% to 0.09%. The spread between 
decile 1 and 10 thus remains as high as 1.36% per month and statistically significant (t-statistic = 
8.12). The significant spread however is due to the poor returns of stocks in decile 10. If we 
compute the return spread between decile 1 and decile 6, it reduces from a statistically significant 
0.53% before correcting the delisting bias to an insignificant 0.24% (i.e., a drop of 55%). The 
correction of the delisting bias has a smaller effect on the value-weighted returns. The reason is 
straightforward: in the month before delisting, most stocks have a small market capitalization. 
Therefore, their low returns in the following month contribute little to the value-weighted portfolio 
returns.  
One may deem the correction of delisting bias unimportant because it does not eliminate the 
return spread between deciles 1 and 10. I disagree for two simple reasons. First, the estimated 
portfolio returns (of any decile) are biased without the correction. Second, the “outperformance” of 
the low growth deciles and the “underperformance” of the high growth deciles have distinct 
reasons, as I will show in the next section. It is still important that the delisting bias alone explains 
the “abnormal” performance of the lowest asset growth decile but not the return spread between 
the two extreme deciles.  
Next I run time-series regressions on both the equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns. The 
alpha estimates suggest consistent results. Both the equal- and value-weighted portfolio alphas for 
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the lowest asset growth portfolio (decile 1) are not statistically different from zero. Recall that the 
alpha for equal-weighted returns is a statistically significant -0.54% before adjusting the delisting 
bias. The spreads in alphas between deciles 1 and 10 are still positive and statistically significant. 
They are clearly driven by the large and negative alphas of the highest asset growth portfolio, which 
is -1.00% for the equally-weighted portfolio and -0.47% for the value-weighted portfolio. Both are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In fact, the alpha of decile 1 is not different from the alphas 
of deciles 2 to 8 for the equally-weighted portfolios, and of deciles 2 to 9 for the value-weighted 
portfolios. In contrast, the alpha of decile10 is significantly different from the alphas of almost all 
the other deciles. 
In summary, the superior (equal-weighted) returns of the low asset growth portfolios are 
largely driven by the delisting bias in CRSP’s monthly stock return file. After correcting this bias, the 
lowest asset growth portfolio earns similar returns to other asset growth portfolios except for the 
two highest asset growth portfolios (deciles 9 and 10). 
5. External financing and its impact on the asset growth anomaly 
It is interesting to learn what drives the significant asset growth for firms in deciles 9 and 10 
and why these firms earn poor returns in the following year. Note that the average asset growth 
rate within a year is 125% for firms in decile 10. It’s hard to imagine any firm can organically grow 
its assets at such a pace. Instead, the substantial asset growth is most likely fuelled by large 
amounts of external financing.  
There is ubiquitous evidence that stock returns underperform following large equity or debt 
financing. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms 
conducting seasoned equity offerings significantly underperform non-issuing firms for up to five 
years following the offerings. Ritter (2003) shows the underperformance during the first five years 
is about 20% relative to control firms matched on size and book-to-market equity. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), on the other hand, find that stock 
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returns outperform various benchmarks following announcement of repurchases. Collins and Kim 
(2012) show that stock-financing acquisitions contribute significantly to asset growth and the poor 
performance following the transaction. Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) 
construct comprehensive measures of equity issuances that capture outstanding share variations 
due to SEOs, stock acquisitions, stock repurchases, and other corporate transactions, and find that 
net equity issues are negatively related to future returns. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find 
return underperformance for firms that have conducted public bond offerings. The average 
magnitude is over 20% in five years. Lee and Loughran (1998) and Dichev and Piotroski (1999) 
find that firms with large issues of convertible debt significantly underperform the market in the 
following years. Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006) find significant long-run return 
underperformance following bank loans despite the widely-documented positive announcement 
returns. Combining the above findings, Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) develop a 
comprehensive measure of net external financing and show a negative relation between this 
measure and future stock returns. The economic and statistical significance of their results is 
stronger than in the previous studies that focus on an individual category of financing.  
I examine two research questions in this section: (1) To what extent are the large increases in 
firm assets driven by external financing? (2) Do the poor returns of the high asset growth firms 
merely reflect the widely-documented return underperformance following large equity or debt 
issuances? To answer the first question, I construct external financing in two different ways, using 
information respectively from balance sheet and statement of cash flow. Here are the variables 
constructed from the balance sheet (BS) data: 
Equity Financing = Change in (Common Equity (CEQL) + Preferred Stock (PSTKL)); 
Debt Financing = Change in (Long-Term Debt (DLTT) + Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC)).   
Following Fama and French (2008) in constructing the book value of equity, I use the liquidity value 
for preferred stock (PSTKL) if available, or the redemption value (PSTKRV) if available, or the 
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carrying value (PSTK). For common equity, I also use the liquidity value (CEQL) if available, or the 
tangible value (CEQT) if available, or the total value (CEQ). The balance sheet external financing is 
the sum of equity and debt financing. The variables constructed from the statement of cash flow 
(SCF) data are as follows: 
Equity Financing = Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK)  
- Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (PRSTKC)  
- Cash Dividends (DV); 
Debt Financing = Long-Term Debt Issuance (DLTIS)  
– Long-Term Debt Reduction (DLTR)  
+ Current Debt Changes (DLCCH). 
External financing is the sum of equity and debt financing except after 1987, the fundamental 
annual file provides an item called Net Cash Flow from Financing Activities (FINCF), which includes 
excess tax benefits of stock options (TXBCOF) and other financing activities (FIAO), in addition to 
the above equity and debt financing items. I thus use FINCF for net external financing since 1988. 
Note the statement of cash flow data are only available since fiscal year 1971. So for the later return 
tests based on this data, the sample period starts from July 1972. 
Table 4 reports the time-series average of the median external financing by firms in each asset 
growth decile. For the purpose of comparison, I reproduce the average asset growth rate in the first 
row. The reported equity, debt, and total external financing are all deflated by the lagged total 
assets, the same as done for the asset growth variable. The impact of external financing on asset 
growth is obvious. For example, the average asset growth rate for firms in decile 10 is 125.5%. 
Based on the balance sheet data, these firms have issued equity amounting to 80% and issued debt 
amounting to 16% of its total assets in the previous year. On average, external financing (105.5% of 
the lagged total assets) explains 84% of the 125.5% asset growth for firms in decile 10. 
Interestingly, for firms in decile 1, the net external financing of -18.7% of the lagged assets also 
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accounts for 87% of the -21.55% asset growth. This might be driven by poor performing firms’ 
failure to refinance their debt. Combined together, of the -147.05% spread in asset growth between 
decile 1 and 10, 85% (-124.24%) is mechanically driven by the firms’ difference in net external 
financing.  
The last three rows of Table 4 presents the external financing variables constructed from the 
statements of cash flow data. These flow variables are presumably “cleaner” measures of external 
financing. Their magnitude is often smaller than that constructed from the stock variables of the 
balance sheet, which could include financing of alternative forms such as capital leases. 
Nevertheless, firms in the highest asset growth decile have issued debt and equity that amount to 
86.16% of its existing assets, which accounts for nearly 70% of their asset growth. It is clear that a 
dominant part of the large asset growth is funded by external financing. Therefore it is necessary to 
control for the impact of external financing before claiming asset growth a new determinant of 
cross-sectional returns.  
To examine if asset growth, net of the impact of external financing, has an independent effect on 
returns, I first subtract each firm’s asset growth by its external financing and then perform return 
tests based on this net asset growth variable. I employ both portfolio sorting and Fama-MacBeth 
regressions and the results are reported, respectively, in Table 5 and 6. Delisting returns are 
included in the tests. Panel A of Table 5 shows the portfolio sorting results based on the balance 
sheet adjusted net asset growth rate. Note the composition of firms in each decile is different from 
that sorted on the raw asset growth rate. The spread in the net asset growth between decile 1 and 
10 becomes smaller, -33.82%, after removing the impact of external financing. The patterns on ME 
and B/M are similar to Table 1 where we sort portfolios based on the raw asset growth. The 
portfolio returns and the Fama-French three-factor alphas suggest no outperformance for stocks in 
decile 1. They even underperform relative to stocks in decile 6, though the differences are not 
always significant. For stocks in decile 10, there is no underperformance if returns are value-
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weighted, while equal-weighted returns still show significant underperformance. Further analysis 
suggests it is mainly due to poor returns of some small firms (i.e., market capitalization smaller 
than $50 million). Overall, the evidence does not support a reliable asset growth effect.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the portfolio returns sorted on the asset growth net of the statement 
of cash flow external financing. Unlike in Panel A, the spread in asset growth in this SCF–adjusted 
variable is still as large as -87.03%.  Nevertheless, neither the portfolio return spreads nor the 
spreads in alphas from the three-factor models are significantly positive. If anything, the value-
weighted return spreads suggest the opposite.  
A recent study by Fama and French (2008) also suggests the importance of equity issues in 
affecting the asset growth anomaly. They divide firms’ total assets by the number of shares 
outstanding and measure asset growth on a per share basis, by which they control for the growth of 
assets due to new equity issues, stock-swap acquisitions, and stock repurchases (for negative 
growth). They show that the asset growth anomaly (on a per share basis) is not robust in large 
stocks. However, even if based on their measure of asset growth, the anomaly still exists in 
microcap and small stocks (market cap below the NYSE median), in both equal- and value-weighted 
returns. Note their asset growth variable does not account for the asset growth driven by debt 
issuances. Next I investigate the results by also controlling for net debt issues. 
Like Fama and French (2008), I also construct a variable of asset growth on a per share basis. 
Unlike them, I subtract net debt issues from asset growth. 
                              
                                   
            (  ) – (              (    )                             (   ))
                         (    )
    
Asset growth is calculated as the percentage change of this variable. The results, presented in Panel 
C, are similar to the previous two Panels. First, there is a large spread in the per share asset growth 
rate; it is -121.82%. Second, there is no outperformance of stocks in decile 1, as suggested by the 
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portfolio return spreads and the alpha spreads between decile 1 and 6. If any, firms in decile 1 tend 
to underperform relative to firms in other deciles except decile 10. Third, the underperformance of 
stocks in decile 10 relative to those in decile 1 disappears when returns are value-weighted. The 
evidence highlights the importance of controlling for the impact of debt issues.  
The portfolio sorting results do not support the asset growth effect on stock returns once 
external financing is controlled for, and especially when value-weighted returns are used in the 
analysis. I also investigate it by Fama-MacBeth regressions. Table 6 presents the results. The 
dependent variable in Panel A is the one-year cumulative returns, from July of year t to June of year 
t+1. The independent variable asset growth is measured from fiscal year t-2 to t-1. I employ the raw 
asset growth rate in the first model. Then in various specifications, I subtract the aggregate external 
financing, or equity and debt financing respectively, from the raw asset growth. The first row labels 
whether these financing variables are based on balance sheet or statement of cash flow items. In all 
specifications I include the log of market capitalization, the book-to-market equity ratio, and the 
previous 12 month return to control for the potential size, value, and momentum effects. The cross-
sectional regressions are run for each year and the table reports the time-series average of the 
regression coefficient estimates. Statistical significance is evaluated by the standard error of the 
time-series coefficients. The regression results are consistent with the portfolio sorting results in 
Table 5. In particular, I confirm a significantly negative relation between the raw asset growth rate 
and stock return in the cross-section. As shown in the first specification, the coefficient of the asset 
growth rate is -0.054 with a t-statistic of -6.48.  However, once I subtract external financing in the 
other model specifications, the net asset growth rate loses explanatory power in all specifications. 
In contrast, external financing, especially net debt issuance, is negatively related to the cross-
sectional returns. The evidence again confirms that the asset growth anomaly is primarily driven by 
the external financing effect that has been documented by many previous studies.  
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I examine the result robustness by using the three-year cumulative returns as the dependent 
variable. That is, for asset growth from fiscal year t-2 to t-1, I compute the cumulative returns from 
July of year t to June of year t+3. All independent variables remain the same. Panel B reports the 
regression results. They are very similar to Panel A results in which the dependent variable is the 
one-year cumulative returns. In addition, the negative coefficients of equity financing also become 
statistically significant. This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Ritter’s (2003) 
findings that the underperformance following SEOs usually becomes worse after the first year. It is 
important to reiterate that the asset growth net of external financing does not predict the 
subsequent three-year returns, in spite of the external financing variables constructed from balance 
sheet or statement of cash flow data. 
In their Section II.D (p.1638-1643), CGS examine the interaction between the asset growth 
anomaly and the share issuance/repurchase anomaly. They run Fama-MacBeth regressions of 
annual stock returns on asset growth and several share issuance variables, and find that the 
coefficient estimates of the asset growth variable remain statistically significant after including the 
share issuance variables. They conclude at the end of the section that “asset growth survives 
controls for the effects of equity issuances and repurchases”. I have two comments. First, the raw 
asset growth variable in CGS’s regressions contains the growth of assets by equity financing. My 
findings in Tables 4 suggest high mechanical correlations between these two variables and 
therefore, multicollinearity is a significant concern and the coefficient estimates of the correlated 
variables are not reliable. Greene (2008, p.59) points out that if explanatory variables are highly 
correlated, coefficient estimates of the regression may have the “wrong” sign or implausible 
magnitudes and, moreover, small changes in the data produce wide swings in the coefficient 
estimates. My regression specifications for the table 6 results overcome this concern. Second, like 
Fama and French (2008), they do not control for the effect of debt issuances on asset growth. Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves (1999) show that small firms underperform by more following debt offerings. 
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CGS’s finding of a stronger asset growth effect in small and medium firms after controlling for share 
issuances, in another way, implies it could be driven by the underperformance following debt 
issuances.  
In fact, some of the CGS results imply the lack of an independent asset growth effect after 
controlling for equity and debt issuances. In their Section II.C, CGS decompose total asset growth 
into four components: stock financing growth, debt financing growth, retained earnings growth, 
and the leftover (which they call operating liabilities growth). They run Fama-MacBeth regressions 
of annual stock returns on the these components of asset growth in all firms as well as firms in 
different size groups, and find that growth in debt predicts significantly negative returns in the 
following year for small and medium size firms but not for large firms whereas growth in equity 
predicts negative returns for small and large firms but not for medium firms. However, neither the 
growth in retained earnings growth nor the growth in operating liabilities predicts returns in the 
subsequent year, after controlling for debt and equity growth, in all the regressions. This is 
consistent with my findings in Table 6 – asset growth net of external financing does not predict 
lower future returns. 
In examining the cross-sectional relation between share issuance and future stock returns, 
Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) find very different results in the pre- and post-1970 data. The relation 
is significantly negative in the post-1970 data but not significant in the pre-1970 data. Since equity 
financing is a significant driver of asset growth and, at least partly, the reasons for the findings of 
the anomaly in my sample, their findings suggest that the asset growth anomaly may also be 
different in the pre-1970 data. The current COMPUSTAT fundamental annual file covers corporate 
accounting data back to 1950, which allows us to do an out-of-sample test of the anomaly. Table 7 
reports the sorting portfolio returns for the period from July 1952 to June 1968, which is not 
examined in CGS. Stocks are sorted into deciles based on their raw asset growth rates in the 
previous fiscal year. The spread in asset growth between decile 1 and 10 is still large though not as 
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much as in the later sample. Firms are on average larger in size, due to COMPUSTAT’s coverage of 
only relatively large firms in the early period. The portfolio return spreads and the Fama-French 
three-factor alphas do not suggest the existence of a robust asset growth anomaly. There is some 
weak evidence in equal-weighted returns but completely no support in value-weighted returns. 
This evidence is consistent with Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) and also confirms the significant role 
of equity financing in driving the asset growth anomaly. The anomaly disappears in the period that 
equity financing does not predict returns. However, a caveat is that firms in the early sample are on 
average larger in size. The asset growth anomaly is shown to be less significant in larger firms 
(Fama and French, 2008).5   
6. Conclusion 
 Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find a significant asset growth effect in the cross-section of 
stock returns. Stocks in the low asset growth deciles outperform while stocks in the high asset 
growth deciles underperform in the following years, generating a substantial return spread for the 
hedging portfolio. This cross-sectional return pattern has generated much research interest and is 
often investigated as a significant new anomaly. Various behavioral and economic explanations are 
provided. I take a different approach by scrutinizing the empirical findings. I show that the superior 
returns of the low asset growth deciles result from the delisting bias in CRSP data and that the poor 
returns of the high asset growth deciles coincide with the return underperformance following large 
external financing. High asset growth is primarily driven by large equity and debt offerings. After 
controlling for the delisting bias and the impact of external financing, I do not find an independent 
asset growth effect on stock returns.  
                                                 
5 Note, however, Fama and French’s (2008) per-share asset growth has adjusted the impact of equity 
financing so made their findings less comparable to the one reported here. Without adjusting share issuance 
(using the raw asset growth variable), CGS actually show that the asset growth anomaly is robust in large 
firms which is defined to have market cap above the 70th of NYSE firms (CGS, Table 2 Panel C, p.1620). 
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My study highlights the importance of correcting delisting bias in asset pricing tests, especially 
in computing returns of portfolios that are potentially related to the delisting probability. For 
instance, value stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks, but value firms tend to perform 
poorly and have a higher probability to be delisted in the subsequent period. The higher returns of 
value stocks could partly be attributed to the omission of delisting returns, if any. The same could 
also apply to the investment growth anomaly, in which firms cutting investment are expected to 
earn higher returns than firms expanding investment.  
Researchers over time have identified dozens of cross-sectional anomalies. For example, Pontiff 
and McLean (2013) survey 82 characteristics that are shown to explain returns in the cross-section. 
My findings in the paper suggest that, before accepting some newly-found return patterns as 
independent anomalies, we should explore hard their potential relations to existing styled return 
patterns. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2013) is such a good example. They find that 
financial distress is an important commonality behind the profitability of many cross-sectional 
return anomalies. Dissections of this sort improve our understanding of anomalies and help to 
reconcile the economic or behavioral rationales behind these anomalies. 
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Table 1  
Portfolio returns sorted on the asset growth rate 
 
At the end of June of each year t from 1968 to 2013, non-financial stocks are allocated into deciles based on their asset growth rate from fiscal year t-2 
to t-1. The portfolios are held for 12 months, from July of year t to June of year t+1, and then rebalanced. The sample of stock returns spans from July 
1968 to December 2013, 544 months in total. This table reports the time-series averages of cross-sectional median annual asset growth rates, market 
capitalization in the month prior to the returns (adjusted by the CPI to December 2013 dollars, in $ millions), book-to-market equity ratio of fiscal year 
t-1, equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns, and Fama and French alphas – the intercepts of the time-series regressions of the 
monthly portfolio returns on the Fama-French three factors. Alphas marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. All returns are in 
percentage. Corporate accounting data are obtained from COMPUSTAT’s fundamental annual file and stock return data are from CRSP’s monthly stock 
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Table 2  
The missing of delisting returns in CRSP monthly stock return file 
 
This table presents the delisting-month return missing information of non-financial firms in the CRSP monthly stock return file during July 1968 to 
December 2013. I first identify the month when a stock is delisted and the last month that the stock’s return is reported in the CRSP monthly stock 
return file, and then compute the time difference between the month of delisting and the last month of reporting return. The month of delisting is 
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Table 3 
Delisting and the impact on asset growth portfolio returns 
 
This table presents the time-series average of the median return on assets (ROA) and the probability of delisting for stocks in each asset growth decile. 
The differences in probability between decile 1 and 10 are tested using the two-proportion z-test. The table also reports the equal and value-weighted 
portfolio returns after correcting the delisting bias and the alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model for each asset growth portfolio, as well as 
the spreads and the associated t-statistics between deciles 1 and 10. Alpha estimates marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4  
External financing and the impact on asset growth portfolio returns 
 
At the end of June of each year t from 1968 to 2013, non-financial stocks are allocated into deciles based on their asset growth rate from fiscal year t-2 
to t-1. The portfolios are held for 12 months, from July of year t to June of year t+1, and then rebalanced. This table presents the time-series average of 
the median net equity issues, net debt issues, and external financing (i.e., the sum of net equity and debt issues) in fiscal year t-1 relative to the issuing 
firms’ total assets in fiscal year t-2. The financing variables are obtained, respectively, from the balance sheet and the statement of cash flow data items. 




Asset growth deciles formed in 
June of year t  1(Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10(High) 
Spread 
(1-10) 
Asset growth rate from fiscal 
year t-2 to t-1 -21.55 -7.09 -1.09 2.95 6.60 10.59 15.75 24.20 42.88 125.49 -147.05 
External financing constructed from balance sheet 
Net equity issues -13.36 -2.81 0.42 2.14 3.69 5.36 7.42 10.92 20.03 80.01 -93.37 
Net debt issues -2.85 -1.66 -0.89 -0.15 0.52 1.22 2.71 4.90 9.13 15.82 -18.67 
External financing   -18.70 -5.99 -1.13 1.94 4.67 7.70 11.67 18.34 33.65 105.54 -124.24 
External financing constructed from statement of cash flow 
Net equity issues 0.06 -0.25 -0.73 -1.06 -1.08 -0.88 -0.57 -0.03 4.59 61.70 -61.64 
Net debt issues -1.93 -1.44 -0.93 -0.38 0.10 0.51 1.39 2.70 5.02 8.09 -10.01 
External financing   -2.12 -3.04 -3.08 -2.37 -1.44 -0.28 1.68 5.82 18.84 86.16 -88.28 
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Table 5  
Asset growth portfolio returns after controlling for the delisting bias and external financing 
 
This table presents the portfolio returns sorted on asset growth after controlling for the delisting bias and external financing. I subtract external 
financing from the raw asset growth for each stock and sort stocks into deciles based on the net asset growth. The table presents firm characteristics 
and portfolio returns. The delisting bias is corrected in computing portfolio returns. Estimates of Fama and French alphas marked with * are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Variables of external financing are constructed from the balance sheet data items for Panel A and from the statement of cash 
flow data items for Panel B. The net asset growth variable for Panel C is constructed on the per share basis, net of debt issues. Details of variable 
construction are presented in Section 5. 
 




Asset growth deciles 







Net asset growth rate 





Standard deviation of the 
net asset growth rates 2.15 1.25 1.01 0.91 0.91 1.01 1.20 1.63 2.73 8.70   
Market capitalization in 
the previous month ($ 
millions, CPI-adjusted) 72.12 136.24 224.76 281.55 337.48 364.57 362.70 318.22 260.47 189.58 -117.46 -292.45 
Book-to-market equity 
ratio in fiscal year t-1 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.16 0.03 
EW portfolio monthly 





VW portfolio monthly 





FF alpha for EW portfolio 





FF alpha for VW portfolio 
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Asset growth deciles 







Net asset growth rate from 
fiscal year t-2 to t-1 -35.70 
-





Standard deviation of the 
net asset growth rates 16.87 7.54 4.54 3.26 2.67 2.47 2.50 2.80 4.57 15.92   
Market capitalization in 
the previous month ($ 
millions, CPI-adjusted) 47.93 70.37 121.29 204.29 301.40 373.66 416.80 441.77 422.19 282.42 -234.49 -325.73 
Book-to-market equity 
ratio in fiscal year t-1 0.27 0.48 0.54 0.51 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.04 -0.13 
EW portfolio monthly 





VW portfolio monthly 





FF alpha for EW portfolio 





FF alpha for VW portfolio 
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Asset growth deciles 







Net asset growth rate 





Standard deviation of the 
net asset growth rates 9.34 8.49 5.86 3.99 3.01 2.63 2.55 3.16 6.32 40.01 -30.68 6.71 
Market capitalization in 
the previous month ($ 
millions, CPI-adjusted) 143.38 100.41 137.61 210.96 307.29 374.20 408.07 378.84 314.80 175.42 -32.04 -230.81 
Book-to-market equity 
ratio in fiscal year t-1 0.25 0.36 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.04 -0.14 
EW portfolio monthly 





VW portfolio monthly 





FF alpha for EW portfolio 





FF alpha for VW portfolio 
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Table 6  
Fama-MacBeth regression of stock returns on asset growth and external financing 
 
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The dependent variable is 12-month (for Panel A) or 36-month (for Panel B) cumulative stock 
returns following the construction of the asset growth rate. The independent variable of research interest is the raw asset growth rate (for the first 
model) or the net asset growth rate after removing the impact of external financing (for the other models). The asset growth rate in the last model is on 
the per-share basis, net of debt issues. Variables of external financing are constructed based on the balance sheet data items (labelled as BS adjusted) or 
the statement of cash flow data items (labelled as SCF adjusted). Other independent variables included as control are natural log of market 
capitalization, book-to-market equity ratio, and the previous 12-month return. The asset growth rates are updated every year and the regressions are 
run for each year. The table presents the time-series average coefficient estimates and, in the parentheses, the associated t-statistics based on the 
standard error of the time-series coefficient estimates. The last three rows report the number of years (regressions), the median number of stocks in 
annual regressions, and the time-series average R-squared. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: 12-month cumulative stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1 
 
Asset growth calculated 
by 
BS - original BS adjusted BS adjusted SCF adjusted SCF adjusted Per-share 
adjusted 































































N(years) 45 45 45 41 41 45 
N(stocks) 3789 3771 3771 3837 3825 3753 
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Panel B: Dependent variable: 36-month cumulative stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+3 
 
Asset growth calculated 
by 
BS - original BS adjusted BS adjusted SCF adjusted SCF adjusted Per-share 
adjusted 































































N(years) 45 45 45 41 41 45 
N(stocks) 3531 3506 3506 3520 3520 3508 
   (%) 3.70 3.77 3.81 3.76 3.86 3.54 
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Table 7  
Out of sample test of the asset growth anomaly: 1952:07-1968:06 
 
This table presents the asset growth portfolio returns in an earlier period. At the end of June of each year t from 1952 to 1967, non-financial stocks are 
allocated into deciles based on their asset growth rate from fiscal year t-2 to t-1. The portfolios are held for 12 months, from July of year t to June of year 
t+1, and then rebalanced. Stock returns used in the tests spans from July 1952 to June 1968, 192 months in total. This table reports the time-series 
averages of cross-sectional median annual asset growth rates, market capitalization in the month prior to the returns (adjusted by the CPI to December 
2013 dollars, in $ millions), equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns, and Fama and French alphas – the intercepts of the time-
series regressions of the monthly portfolio returns on the Fama-French three factors. Alphas marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
All returns and asset growth rates are in percentage. Corporate accounting data are obtained from COMPUSTAT’s fundamental annual file and stock 




Asset growth deciles formed 







Asset growth rate from fiscal 





Standard deviation of the 
asset growth rates 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08   
Market capitalization in the 
previous month ($ millions, 
CPI-adjusted) 258.17 526.06 703.30 943.66 1355.98 1051.56 1169.37 1052.14 856.61 685.36   
EW portfolio monthly 





VW portfolio monthly 





FF alpha for EW portfolio 





FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns -0.10 -0.20 -0.14 -0.06 0.20* -0.04 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.01 
-0.11 
(-0.50) 
-0.06 
(-0.41) 
